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The Historical Development of the
Kentucky Courts
By WmLiAm E. BiviN
I. COURTS OF THE FRONTIER PERIOD
The purpose of this report is to outline the historical evolution
of Kentucky's judicial system. Emphasls is placed upon the provis-
ions of each of Kentucky s four constitutions, implementing sta-
tutes and judicial decisions. These have shaped the various pat-
terns of organizational structure and ]urisdiction, determined the
methods of selecting and removing judges, and established stand-
ards governing judicial qualifications and compensation. These
aspects of the judicial system are discussed separately with re-
spect to conditions existing: (1) during the frontier period; (2)
after statehood and the 1792 constitution; (3) under the 1799
constitution; (4) under the 1850 constitution; and (5) under the
present constitution.
A simple system was adequate to meet the requirements of
the early pioneer communities in Kentucky Crnmes were rare
because men were bound closely by common danger and pos-
sessed very little property of a kind subject to theft. Litigation
was unusual since there were few commercial transactibns. The
most frequent offense was assault and battery, and personal dis-
putes often were settled by wager of battle in a fist-and-skull
encounter. For the most part, the military organization main-
tamed civil order in Kentucky's fortified frontier settlements
prior to 1776. In the winter of that year Virginia granted to Ken-
tucky the status of a county, and placed limited powers of civil
government in a system of local courts.i
* Tis article was originally prepared by Mr. Bivin for the Legislative Re-
search Commission. It is published in substantially the same form as Legislative
Research Commission Publication No. 63.
*
0 A.B., LL.B., Member of the Kentucky Bar, Senior Administrative Analyst,
Legislative Research Commission.1 Levin, The Lawyers and Lawmakers of Kentucky 8-10 (1897); 1 Collins,
History of Kentucky 249-50 (1924); 2 id. 606.
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Inferior Trial Courts
The local courts initially provided for Kentucky County were
organized into a system consisting of: (1) three Courts of
Quarter-Sessions meeting quarter-yearly and having jurisdiction
to try misdemeanors and civil cases involving more than twenty-
five shillings (The first court ever held in Kentucky met in quar-
ter-session at Harrodsburg in the spring of 1777.); (2) three
County Courts meeting monthly to handle business of civil ad-
ministration other than that expressly given to the Quarter-Session
Courts; and (3) special Examining Courts held by individual jus-
tices of the peace to inquire into and determine the validity of
serious criminal charges. Examining justices could dismiss the
charges or hold the accused over for trial with or without bail.
What this system required by way of the exact number of
justices, their tenure, removal, qualifications or compensation is
not known. It is known that the Governor of Virginia appointed
justices of the peace who were assigned to serve on one court or
the other.
General Trial Court
The typical pattern of court organization provided for colonies
and frontier territories in other areas of the country during this
period included a centralized trial court of general jurisdiction.'
Kentucky County had no such court. Important cases, e.g., those
involving capital punishment or title to land, could be tried only
in Virginia at Richmond or Williamsburg.4
The need for a general trial court, however, became apparent
as soon as settlement grew heavier. The Virginia land law did
not provide for a general official rectangular survey of Kentucky
into whole, half and quarter sections. Instead, each possessor of
a land warrant located it where he pleased and surveyed it at
his own expense. Confusion and disputes resulting from the vague
and inaccurate descriptions made by hunters and pioneers pro-
duced a flood of land-seeking settlers.5 A consequent increase in
population led to the elevation of Kentucky County to the status
of a district in 1783. At the same time a centralized trial court
2 Ibid.
3 Council of State Governments, Trial Courts of General Jurisdiction in the
Forty-Eight States 1 (1951).
4 Supra note 1.
5 1 Collins, op. cit. supra note 1, at 253.
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of general jurisdiction was established. The court was styled the
Supreme Court for the District of Kentucky, and it had general
trial jurisdiction of all criminal and civil cases. Territorially, its
jurisdiction was co-extensive with the district.
The court held its first session at Harrodsburg, and seventeen
culprits were presented to the grand jury-nine for keeping tip-
pling-houses and eight for other offenses. A courthouse and jail of
hewed or sawed logs nine inches thick was built at Danville."
Appellate Courts
Virginia did not organize a court with authority to handle ap-
pellate work in Kentucky. Litigants in Kentucky County and the
District of Kentucky could obtain review of the judgments rend-
ered by local trial courts only by crossing the mountains to the
Virginia Court of Appeals.
II. STATEHOOD-COURTS FROM 1792 TO 1799
The first constitution of the State of Kentucky was adopted
and ratified in convention at Danville on April 19, 1792. It pro-
vided that the government should commence on June 1 of that
year, the effective date of Kentucky's admission to the federal
union. The plan for organization of the government outlined in
the constitution established the judiciary as one of three equal
departments.
The drafters of Kentucky's ftrst constitution followed the fed-
eral example and made no attempt to spell out in detail a rigid
system of courts. Instead, they established a very flexible system
by inserting broad language which created:
... one supreme court, which shall be styled the Court of
Appeals and.., such inferior courts as the Legislature may,
from time to time, ordain and establish.8
The constitution empowered the legislature to outline the de-
tailed pattern of organizational structure, to determine the neces-
sary number and proper allocation of judges, and to define and
alter the jurisdiction of the courts. Pursuant to this broad author-
ity, the first session of the legislature passed an act that William
6 Id. at 258.
7Clark, A History of Kentucky 77 (1950).
SKy. Const., Art. V, § 1 (1792).
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Littlel called "important as being one of the links by which the
legislature have connected the practical jurisprudence of this
country with that of Virginia." The act organized Kentucky's
judicial departnfient into a system consisting of the following:
(1) two sets of inferior trial courts, the Courts of Quarter-Sessions
and County Courts; (2) a criminal court of general jurisdiction,
the Court of Oyer and Terminer; and (3) one supreme court, the
Court of Appeals."
Injerior Trial Courts
The legislature authorized the appointment of 125 justices of
the peace for service on the inferior courts. The appointments
were made from each of thirteen counties in accordance with the
following statutorily fixed quota: three in Logan; eight in Shelby;
nine each in Jefferson, Scoft, Washington, and Bourbon; ten each
in Mason, Woodford, Madison, Lincoln and Mercer; twelve in
Fayette; and sixteen in Nelson."°
The legislature established a Court of Quarter-Sessions in each
county, and provided that three of each county's quota of justices
serve on this court. Any two of the three justices constituted a
quorum. The court held three sessions a year, each lasting six
juridical days unless the business before it was finished sooner.
It was a court of record, and succeeded to most of the civil
powers, authority and jurisdiction that the Supreme Court for the
District of Kentucky had under Virginia law. Court of Quarter-
Sessions had jurisdiction to try all civil cases, at common-law and
chancery, amounting to more than five pounds "current money"
or. 1,000 pounds of tobacco, and criminal cases not punishable by
loss of life or member. Jurisdiction extended to all cases, involving
escheats and forfeitures, and it had power to award writs of ne
exeat and habeas corpus and injunctions."
Judges of Court of Quarter-Sessions also sat in the capacity of
Examining Court to inquire into and determine the validity of
criminal charges. Criminal charges could be made under oath
before any Quarter-Sessions judge. If in the judge's opinion the
charge ought to be examined, he took recognizances of material
witnesses, committed the accused to county jail, and issued his
9 1 Littel, The Statute Law of Kentucky 90 (1819) (hereinafter cited as
- Litt. - ).
10Id ch. 23, §1.
11 Id. ch. 23. § 6.
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warrant to the sheriff directing him to summon the other justices
of Quarter-Sessions to sit as Examining Court within not less than
five nor more than ten days.
Examining Court had power to dismiss the charges altogether,
to commit the accused person to county jail for trial before the
next Quarter-Session, or to the state public jail at Lexington for
trial before the Court of Oyer and Terminer. The accused could
be released on bail by either the Court of Quarter-Session or the
Court of Oyer and Terminer.' 2
In addition to the Court of Quarter-Sessions, each county had
a County Court. Three justices were assigned to County Court,
but any two justices constituted a quorum. Each of these courts
held a monthly session lasting six juridical days except during the
month designated for holding Quarter-Session Court for that
county.
County Court succeeded to most of the powers, authority and
jurisdiction that it had before statehood. It had cognizance of all
civil matters not expressly vested in the Court of Quarter-Sessions,
and of cases respecting wills, letters of administration, roads, mills,
the appointment and superintendance of guardians, and the ad-
mitting of deeds and other writings to record.13
In 1796 the legislature expanded the function of County Court
to include various administrative 'duties. The Court was directed
to: (a) superintend public inspections; (b) grant licenses to
ordinaries, and regulate and restrain ordinaries and tippling
houses; (c) appoint processioners; (d) hear and determine dis-
putes between apprentices and their masters; (e) establish and
regulate ferries; (f) provide for the poor; and (g) erect, maintain
and repair public buildings, including a common jail and county
prison and one pillory, whipping post and stocks. It was author-
ized to erect a ducking stool.'
4
Each justice of the peace could hold court individually.
Justice's Court had jurisdiction of all civil causes of a value up to
five pounds "current money" or 1,000 pounds of tobacco.
Justice's Court judgments in cases of a value up to fifty shil-
lings or 500 pounds of tobacco were final, but in cases of greater
value appeal to the next Court of Quarter-Session was a matter of
12 Id. ch. 23, § 8.
13 Id. ch. 23, §4.
14 1 Litt. 373, ch. 256.
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right. On appeal the justice delivered all papers and a copy of his
judgment to the clerk of the Court of Quarter-Sessions, where the
case was docketed to be heard and determined at the next term
"... in a summary way, without pleading in writing according to
the right and justice of the case.""
The 1796 legislature passed an act to reduce into one the sev-
eral acts establishing County Courts and concerning the appoint-
ment of justices of the peace and their jurisdiction. The act
changed the route of appeals from Quarter-Sessions to the next
monthly session of County Court, and reduced the dividing line
from fifty to twenty-five shillings.'-
General Trial Court - Criminal
The legislature recognized a need for a trial court of general
statewide criminal jurisdiction, and provided a Court of Oyer and
Terminer to serve the entire state in that capacity. The court was
composed of three judges, but any two constituted a quorum. The
court held two six-day sessions annually at Lexington, one in April
and the other in September.
The Court of Oyer and Terminer succeeded to the criminal
powers, authority and jurisdiction of the old Supreme Court for
the District of Kentucky. The new court had general criminal
jurisdiction co-extensive with the state. It could "... hear and de-
termine all treasons, murders, felonies and other crimes and mis-
demeanors . . . " upon presentment by the grand jury, provided
that the penalty inflicted by law in the case was more than forty
shillings or 400 pounds of tobacco. Judgments of the court were
final and not reviewable. 1
7
Appellate Courts
The constitution established the Court of Appeals, and gave
it original and final jurisdiction of all cases respecting the tiles to
land. On the other hand, it specifically authorized the legislature
to divest the court of this jurisdiction, and in general terms pro-
vided for legislative regulation of the jurisdiction of all courts
according to the needs of proper administration of justice.'8
The legislature, at its first session, implemented the constitu-
'5 Id. ch. 23, § 2.16 Id. cl. 256, § 8.
17 Id. ch. ), §§ 13, 14.
18 Ky. Const., Art. V, § 3 (1792).
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tional grant of original and final trial jurisdiction of land title
cases. It directed transfer of all papers belonging to such cases
then pending in the Supreme Court for the District of Kentucky to
the Clerk of the Cout of Appeals for trial by the new court.'9 Also
it authorized the Court of Appeals, upon petition of the defend-
ant, to remove land title cases from any inferior court to the
Court of Appeals, by issuing writs of certiorari. A single judge
could entertain such petitions and direct issuance of the writ. The
court, in its discretion, could try the cause, or remand it to the
court from which it was removed. °
The initial legislative definition of appellate jurisdiction gave
the court power to review all final judgments and decrees of the
Court of Quarter-Sessions in civil cases amounting to twenty
pounds or more, and cases relating to a franchise or freehold, re-
gardless of amount. The statute also gave the court jurisdiction
to review all judgments of the old Supreme Court for the District
of Kentucky, including appeals brought directly and those then
pending in the Court of Appeals of Virginia.21 An orderly pro-
cedure for the transfer of cases was provided.
The court's appellate jurisdiction could be exercised by means
of appeal or writ of error. Appeals were prayed in the court below
at the time the judgment, sentence or decree was rendered. Writs
of error were sued out in the Court of Appeals. Writs of error were
issued as a matter or right, except in the criminal cases decided
by the Court of Oyer and Terminer. The statute denied review
of Oyer and Terminer cases and from its judgments no certiorari,
appeal, supersedeas or writ of error was allowed.
In cases of wills, mills and roads, the plaintiff in error was per-
mitted to assign errors upon matters of fact as well as upon mat-
ters of law. In all other cases assignment of errors was restricted
to matters of law.22
General Trial Court - Civil and Criminal
Neither the judicial article of the first constitution nor the
initial implementing legislation established a trial court of general
state-wide civil jurisdiction. The reason for this is not clear, but
19 I Litt. 101, ch. 24, § 13, 23.
20Id. §16.
21 Id. §§ 14, 15, 17.22 Id. §§ 17, 18.
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very likely it was thought that the original jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals in land title cases and the broadly defined juris-
diction of the local Quarter-Sessions Courts would be adequate to
take care of the civil case docket.
In any event, the legislature, in the preamble to an act of
1795, declared that ".... the delays inseparable from the present
constitution of the Court of Appeals, is equal to a denial of justice,
and the expense occasioned thereby burdensome to suitors."23 The
act reorganized the entire trial court structure. It terminated the
original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and abolished the
Court of Oyer and Terminer. It replaced them with a system of
District Courts of general civil and criminal jurisdiction. The
district court system was headed by a General Court.
The act of 1795 created a system of District Courts. It divided
the state into six districts, and provided for the appointment of six
judges. There was no requirement that each district be repre-
sented, and no record has been found to indicate whether or not
any particular custom was followed in making appointments.
Court was to be held annually in each district, four fifteen-day ses-
sions for the Frankfort district and two in each of the other five. 4
The act gave the District Court civil jurisdiction,
... over all persons and in all causes, matters and things at
common law, or in chancery, arising within their districts,
whether brought before them by original process, certiorari,
or mandamus, or by any other legal ways and means what-
soever, except of actions of assault and battery, or suits of
slander, which shall be cognizable in the Courts of Quarter-
Sessions only... 2 5
Another limitation restricted trials on original process to matters
or things valued at fifty pounds or more, unless against justices of
an inferior court.26
Land title suits then pending in the Court of Appeals under its
original jurisdiction were removable to the District Court for the
district in which the land was situated. Either party had a right
of removal, and detailed procedures for transfer of papers were
established.
23 1 Litt. 298, ch. 201.
24Id. § 2.
25 Id. § 8.
26 bid.
27 Id. § 22.
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District Court was given criminal jurisdiction over ". . . all
treasons, murders, felonies and other crimes and misdemean-
ors . . ." committed within the respective district, "... except
breaches of the penal laws."28
However, pending establishment of adequate district jails, the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction was restricted to the District
Court held at Frankfort. The judges of the Franklin District were
directed to set aside the first three days of each session for trial
of criminals, and the other District Courts were forbidden to con-
duct criminal trials. Provision was made for transfer of all prison-
ers to the public jail at Frankfort for trial. 9 This arrangement
lasted for only one year. An act of 1796 authorized each District
Court to exercise its criminal jurisdiction."0
District Court was vested with appellate jurisdiction to re-
view judgments rendered by the former Supreme Court for the
District of Kentucky."- This, also, was a separate temporary
arrangement. The legislature abolished all appellate jurisdiction
of District Court in 1796.32
The act that established the District Court also created a
central coordinating body. Its apparent purpose was to exercise
a unifying influence over the District Courts. All six district
judges were required to meet periodically at Frankfort. This
meeting was variously described as, "General Session," "General
Term," and "General Court."
At first, General Court met only once each year. Two of
the six judges were to attend court in each district. Initially, the
sole function of the General Court was to allot among them-
selves the districts in which they, respectively, would serve. In
1796 the legislature required General Court to hold two ten-
day sessions annually. 3 Under this act district assignments
were made twice a year, and General Court was given venue of,
... all causes, suits and motions against public debtors,
sheriffs, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and all col-
lectors of public money, and all public debtors of every de-
28 Id. § 10.
29d. § 81.
801 Litt. 477, ch. 263.
81 Id. ch. 201, § 22.
2 1d. ch. 263, § 16.
88 Ibid.
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nomination whatsoever, for and in behalf of the Common-
wealth.34
In addition, General Court was authorized to decide new or
difficult questions of law certified to it by any District Court. A
judgment of General Court was entered as the judgment of
the certifying District Court.35
An act of 1799 gave the General Court original jurisdiction,
... in all controversies between non-residents, and between
non-residents and the citizens of this state, where the matter
in dispute shall be above the value of twenty dollars...s6
The same act provided for removal of land disputes between
citizens from District Court to the General Court by consent
and agreement of the parties.37
Judicial Selection, Tenure, Qualifications, Compensation and
Removal
The constitution required that all judges be appointed by the
Governor to serve during good behavior. All judges were re-
movable by impeachment, or by the Governor, for any reason-
able grounds not sufficient for impeachment, on the address of
two-thirds of each branch of the legislature. 3
8
Neither the constitution nor the implementing statutes pre-
scribed any particular qualifications for judicial office. Moreover,
the legislature authorized the Governor in 1795 to fill vacancies
on Courts of Quarter-Sessions by appointing any fit person
whether or not the appointee was one of the 125 justices of the
peace.39
The constitution instructed the legislature to provide an
adequate compensation for judicial service and prohibited the
reduction of a judge's salary during his term of office. The legis-
lature implemented this instruction by awarding: (1) each judge
of the Court of Appeals an annual salary of $666.66;40 (2) each
justice of Quarter-Session Court a salary amounting to twelve shil-
lings per day of actual court service;4 and (3) District Court
34Ia. §5.
35 Id. § 11.
36 2 Litt. 809, ch. 210, § 1.37 Ibid.38 Ky. Const., Art. V, § 2 (1792).
39 1 Litt. ch. 221, at 852.
40 I Collins, op. cit. supra note 1, at 41.
4'1 Litt. ch. 28, § 12.
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judges an annual salary of 150 pounds. County Court justices were
compensated under a statutory schedule of fees which they taxed
to the bills of costs of the party requesting the service. Judges
of the Court of Oyer and Terminer received a salary of $100.4
III. COURTS FROM 1799 TO 1850
The seven years following adoption of the first constitution
was a turbulent period in Kentucky history. It was characterized
by Indian trouble, foreign intrigue, growing discontent with
slavery and public dissatisfaction with a system of government
that removed the choice of the Governor and the senators from
direct popular control. In 1799 Kentucky took advantage of a
provision of the first constitution that contemplated a possible
need for early revision, and called a constitutional convention.
The delegates assembled at convention to draft Kentucky's
second constitution amidst this background of unsettled con-
ditions. The important factions had pledged to work for an in-
dependent judiciary.
Nevertheless, it was during the era following adoption of the
second constitution that Kentucky's judiciary fell victim to vio-
lent forces unleashed by a bitter social, economic and political
upheaval. This memorable epoch is commonly known as the
"Old Court-New Court Struggle." Because of the role played
by the legislature in the "Old Court-New Court Struggle," which
dominated this period of the development of Kentucky's judicial
department and helped set the stage for agitation for a third
constitution, it is necessary to divide the discussion of this period
into two phases:
(1) Changes made by the second constitution, and
(2) Changes made by legislation enacted "pursuant" to that
document.
CHANGES MADE BY THE SECOND CONSTITUTION
The convention honored the delegates' pledge for independent
courts and judges. The judicial article of the new constitution
made no dramatic departures from the approach taken by the
first constitution. It contained executive appointment of all
42 Id. ch. 27; Id. ch. 201, § 29.
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judges and retained tenure for life during good behavior. The
new judicial article employed virtually the same broad language
as the first one, and created one Court of Appeals. It authorized
the legislature to create necessary inferior courts and to supply
the details of organization, jurisdiction and operation of all
courts in the judicial department.
On the other hand, several minor innovations were incor-
porated into the second document which gave constitutional
status to selected features of earlier legislation. For example,
each court in the department was authorized to appoint its own
clerk; the Court of Appeals was restricted to appellate jurisdic-
tion only; a County Court was established for each county, and
the prohibition against reduction of a judge's salary during his
term in office was omitted.4" Clearly, these changes, except for
the one mentioned last, did no violence to the concept of an in-
dependent judiciary.
CHANGES MADE BY LEGISLATON
Fundamentally, the organization, jurisdiction and operation of
the system of local inferior trial courts established by the legisla-
ture under the first constitution remained unchanged during the
period under the second constitution. The occasional alterations
made were minor ones, and will be covered incidentally in the
following discussion.
Establishment of Circuit Court
By 1801 the workload of the District Court system had in-
creased to an extent that the system was unable to carry it. Ac-
cordingly, the legislature reorganized Kentucky's general trial
court structure into a system of Circuit Court districts. This
system, like its predecessor, was to be operated under a centra-
lized General Court as the coordinating body. Emphatically,
the underlying concept was that the Circuit Court was a single
court serving the entire state by sitting in districts.44
The legislature abolished the old General Court but created
a new one with the same name and functions. The plan author-
ized appointments from the state-at-large of nine circuit judges
43 Ky. Const., Art IV, §§ 1-12 (1799).
44 1 Efficiency Commission of Kentucky, The Government of Kentucky
456-496 (1923).
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to sit for two fifteen day terms annually at Frankfort as a General
Court. The new General Court succeeded to the powers, author-
ity and jurisdiction that its predecessor had under the District
Court arrangement.45
The reorganization established the Circuit Court and directed
it to sit in each of nine newly created districts. The General Court
assigned each of its members to a district for service as presiding
judge of the Circuit Court. Each sat with two assistant judges
appointed from that district. Three terms were held annually in
each district.
The District Court was abolished as was the Court of Quarter-
Sessions in the counties where the Circuit Court would sit. The
three-judge Circuit Court succeeded to the powers, authority,
and jurisdiction of these courts, and provision was made for
transfer of records and papers. Circuit Court had general origi-
nal trial jurisdiction of all causes, at common law and chancery,
criminal and civil, except those of a value less than five pounds
in money or 1,000 pounds of tobacco. In addition they had juris-
diction to try de novo appeals from judgments by Justice's Court
in cases of a value over five pounds in money or 1,000 pounds of
tobacco.40
Old Court-New Court Struggle
Sections one and two of the fourth article of the second Con-
stitution read as follows:
Sec. 1. The judicial power of this Commonwealth both
as to matters of law and equity, shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, which shall be styled the Court of Ap-
peals, and in such inferior courts as the General Assembly
may, from time to time, erect and establish.
Sec. 2. The Court of Appeals, except in cases other-
wise directed by this Constitution, shall have appellate juris-
diction only, which shall be co-extensive with the State,
under such restrictions and regulations, not repugnant to
this Constitution, as may, from time to time, be prescribed
by law.47
Clearly, the intent was to establish the Court of Appeals as a
constitutional court at the head of the judicial department which
was to be equal with and coordinate to the legislative and execu-
45 3 Litt. ch. 23, at 37; See also oh. 43, 504.
46Ibid.
4
7Ky. Const., Art. IV, §§ 1, 2 (1799).
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tive departments. Today no lawyer would suppose that it could
be abolished by any method except a change in the constitution
itself. However, the legislature attempted to abolish that tribunal
in 1824.
The decade from 1819 to 1829 was a period of panics, too
many state banks, an excess of paper money and creditor-
defrauding.48
In 1818 the legislature chartered forty-six semi-independent
branch banks and authorized them to issue $26,000,000 in paper
money. By mid-summer of 1819, business houses and United
States branch banks would not accept this currency. Kentucky
debtors were near ruination, and clamoring for relief. Early in
1820 the legislature passed a replevin act, which permitted debt-
ors to endorse their notes with the words "Notes of the Bank of
Kentucky or its branches will be accepted in discharge of this
execution." If the creditor-plaintiff refused to accept this endorse-
ment, the defendant-debtor could replevy the debt for two years.
In 1822, Judge James Clark of the Bourbon Circuit Court held
the act unconstitutional in the case of Williams v. Blair, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
The United States Supreme Court had enunciated the doctrine
of judicial review of legislation in the case of Marbury v. Madison
decided more than twenty years earlier. Many Kentuckians were
not yet convinced that this was sound doctrine. The majority of
the next session of the legislature favored the relief measure, and
denounced the judges as usurpers, tyrants, and kings. An attempt
to remove the incumbents failed for lack of a two-thirds majority,
but at the 1824 session the dominant party passed an act en-
titled "An Act to reorganize the Court of Appeals." In effect it
purported to abolish the constitutional "old court" and substitute
a legislative "new court."
The Governor signed the measure and appointed judges who
sympathized with the relief laws. The "old court" refused to re-
cognize the validity of the act, and for two years both the "old
court" and the "new court" held sessions. Some litigants appealed
to one court and some to the other. Some circuit judges recog-
4 s Information in this section is taken from: Stickles, The Critical Court
Struggle in Kentucky 1819-29; Wilson, "The Old Court and New Court Contro-
versy in Kentucky," Proceedings Kentucky State Bar Association 54 (1915).
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nized one and some the other as the true court, while several
alternately recognized both.
The voters settled the crisis by electing a legislature which, in
1826, repealed the "act to reorganize the Court of Appeals" by
passing ".... An Act to remove the unconstitutional obstructions
which have been thrown in the way of the Court of Appeals." The
"new court" vanished and the "old court," redeemed and rein-
stated, resumed its accustomed duties.
The "old court" won the immediate struggle. Nevertheless,
the public continued to be dissatisfied with a system that ap-
pointed for life judges with power to decide that a popular
legislative measure was null and void under the constitution. This
popular dissatisfaction was one of the principal reasons for calling
a constitutional convention in 1850.
IV. COURTS FROM 1850 TO 1892
Governmental reform was uppermost in the popular mind by
the time the 1850 constitutional convention met. Memories of the
"Old Court-New Court Struggle" of the 1820's were fresh and
bitter, and there was considerable agitation to place the selection
of judges under the direct control of the popular majority vote.49
The judicial article of the third constitution dealt more with
the details of court organizations than its two predecessors, which
had left such matters, for the most part, to the legislature. The
general provisions of the new article vested the judicial power
in one supreme court (the Court of Appeals), courts established
by the constitution, and such courts inferior to the supreme court
as the General Assembly might erect and establish.50
Specific provisions of the article and implementing legislation
established in each county a set of trial courts of limited jurisdic-
tion consisting of a County Court, a fiscal court called Court of
Claims, a Quarterly Court and several Justices' Courts. Each
county also had a trial court of general jurisdiction called the
Circuit Court. Appellate jurisdiction was vested in the Court of
Appeals until 1882 when the legislature created the Superior
Court as an intermediate court to assist the Court of Appeals.
40 Clay, "Kentucky's New Deal of the 1820's," 4 Ky. S. B. J. 17-32 (1939).5 0 Ky. Const., Art. IV, § 1 (1850).
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Trial Courts of Limited Jurisdiction
Specific provisions of the judicial article established a County
Court in each county. County Courts were organized to consist
of one presiding judge and two associate judges, with any two
constituting a quorum. The office of presiding judge was given
constitutional status, but the legislature was authorized to abolish
the office of associate judge at any time 1
The legislature vested the County Court with appellate juris-
diction of cases decided by Justices' Court that involved a value
between $4.00 and $16.00. For the most part, however, County
Court functioned as the legislative and administrative authority
of the county. It had the power to lay and collect taxes and
maintain buildings, and to superintend and control the fiscal
affairs and property of the county. The exact procedure used
in exercising these powers is not clear, but apparently they were
exercised by the court when it sat in October as a Court of
Claims.52
The new judicial article instructed the legislature to divide
each county into an unspecified number of justices of the peace
districts, and provided for the election of two justices from each
district.5 3
The legislature authorized justices to hold separate courts on
order of the county judge. Justices' Court had examining juris-
diction in criminal cases, and trial jurisdiction of misdemeanors
punishable by a fine not exceeding $16.00. They had jurisdiction
of all civil cases up to a value of $16.00 and of contract cases up
to a value of $50.00. Justices' Court also had equity jurisdiction,
concurrent with that of Circuit and Quarterly Court, to issue
writs of attachment on judgment debts up to $50.00 where execu-
tion was returned nulla bona. 4
Section 37 of the article provided that,
The General Assembly may provide, by law, that the
justice of the peace in each county shall sit at the Court of
Claims, and assist in laying the county levy and making
appropriations only.55 [Emphasis added.]
51 Id. § 29.
2 Wickliffe, Turner & Nicholas, Revised Statute of Kentucky 234 (1852).
53 Ky. Const., Art. IV, § 34 (1850).
54 Wickliffe, Turner & Nicholas, supra note 52 at 238-39.55 Ky. Const., Art. IV, § 37 (1850).
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The legislature provided that a Court of Claims be held in
each county in October of each year. The court consisted of a
majority of the county's justices of the peace, and met at the call
of the county judge, who presided. Justices of the peace were
authorized to participate only when the court was engaged in
laying the county levy, and appropriating money.56
The legislature organized a Quarterly Court in each county
to be conducted by the county judge. It replaced the old Court
of Quarter-Sessions, which had been abolished upon creation of
the Circuit Court. Its jurisdiction was concurrent with Justices'
Court in all civil cases, and with Circuit Court in cases amount-
ing to less than $100.00, except those involving title to real
estate.57
Trial Courts of General Jurisdiction
The General Court was abandoned. The only feature retained
was its jurisdiction of Commonwealth cases. Section 6 of Article
8 of the constitution authorized the legislature to direct ". . . in
what manner, and in what courts, suits may be brought against
the Commonwealth." The legislature gave the Circuit Court of
Franklin County jurisdiction in behalf of the Commonwealth,
... of all cases, suits and motions against clerks of courts,
collectors of public money, and all public debtors or de-
faulters of any denomination, and others claiming under
them; and for this purpose its jurisdiction shall be co-exten-
sive with the state.58
There was no specific provision for any alternative method of
centralized coordination. There ceased to be a trial court for an
entire state. Instead, a multiplicity of uncoordinated semi-autono-
mous trial courts was substituted for the state-wide court con-
cept. Each court acted and lived practically regardless of the
existence of the others. Instead of a trial bench, Kentucky was to
have a number of judges, many of whom would never see each
other. This situation was to prevail until organization of the Ju-
dicial Conference and the Judicial Council in 1950.
The judicial article instructed the legislature to divide the state
into twelve circuit districts, each to consist of a number of coun-
56 Wickliffe, Turner & Nicholas, supra note 52 at 234-35.
57 Id. at 232.
58 Id. at 231.
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ties grouped together. A Circuit Court was established in each
county then existing or thereafter created, and the circuit judge
held court in each county of the district from which he was
elected.
The legislature vested the Circuit Court with original trial
jurisdiction of all matters, in law and equity, not specifically
delegated to other courts, and appellate jurisdiction of specified
cases decided by County, Quarterly and Justices' Courts.
One district could be added each four years, but the total
number was limited to sixteen until the state's population should
exceed 1,500,000. Except for creation of new districts, changes in
the districts could be made only at the first session of the General
Assembly after a census.59
Appellate Courts
The general provisions of the judicial article established one
supreme court to be styled the Court of Appeals. Specific sec-
tions provided for the court to consist of four judges to be elected
from districts to be drawn by the legislature, which in turn was
authorized to reduce the number of judges and districts to a
minimum of three.
The judicial article limited the court to appellate jurisdiction
only, and required it to hold sessions at the seat of government.
However, the legislature was authorized to define the details of
its appellate jurisdiction. Also the legislature could direct the
court to hold sessions in any one or more of the appellate districts,
but there is no indication that it ever did so.
The legislature vested the Court of Appeals with jurisdiction
to review directly all judgments amounting to $100.00 or more.
However, cases appealable from inferior courts to Circuit Court
were excepted from the court's review jurisdiction. Felony cases
were also excepted until the Criminal Code of 1854 permitted a
convicted felon to appeal.60
The general provision of the judicial article authorized the
legislature to create courts inferior to the Court of Appeals. By
1882 the Court of Appeals had over 1,800 cases pending on its
docket, and the legislature created an intermediate court, the
9 K.Const., Art. IV, § § 16-28 (1850); Wickliffe, Turner & Nicholas, supra
note 52 at 218-30.6OKy. Const., Art. IV, § § 2-15 (1850); Wickliffe, Turner & Nicholas, supra
note 52 at 214-18.
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Superior Court, to assist in handling the workload. For thirty-two
years trial work had been conducted by the autonomous Circuit
Courts without any unifying influence such as that provided by
the old General Court. This condition tended to promote lack of
uniformity in decisions at the trial level, which, in turn, stimulated
an increased number of appeals. The Superior Court consisted
of three judges, and it had jurisdiction of all appeals except those
involving the validity of statutes; title to a freehold or right to a
franchise; felonies; or judgments for money or property in cases
where the amount involved was greater than $8,000, exclusive of
interest and costs.
A limited double appeal to the Court of Appeals was avail-
able since the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of all
final orders and judgments of the Superior Court except: (a)
where the amount of fine or value in controversy was less than
$1,000, exclusive of interest and costs; or (b) where a judgment
of the trial court was affirmed by the Superior Court without
dissent.
Moreover, two judges of the Superior Court could certify to
the Court of Appeals any case falling within these two cate-
gories if in their opinion the case involved a novel question. How-
ever, in actual operation the judges would not use this valuable
tool. No cases were certified on the basis of novelty or importance
of the question. Supporters of the intermediate court attempted
to off-set criticisms by proposing to give the Court of Appeals
authority to make the determination as to the novelty or im-
portance of questions.6'
judicial Selection, Tenure, Qualifications, Compensation
and Removal
For fifty years the Governor had had the power to appoint
most public officials for life tenure. Abuses and resentment were
commonplace. Jacksonian democracy took root and dominated
opinion at the time of the 1850 convention. The third constitu-
tion swung to the other extreme, and made all public offices ex-
cept two elective.
The courts came in for a full share of criticism. There was a
public reaction against the doctrine under which judges ap-
O1Legislative Research Commission, Intermediate Courts (Informational
Bulletin No. 12.).
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pointed for life had power to invalidate popular legislation. The
judicial article reflected the then current opinion by abandon-
ing executive appointment of judges. All judges were to be
chosen by popularvote.
The reduction of tenure from life during good behavior to a
term of years was a corollary feature of the elective method of
selection, and judges' tenure in office was made dependent upon
their ability to secure election for terms of years: judges of the
Court of Appeals, eight years; judges of Circuit Courts, six
years; judges of County Courts, four years, and justices of the
peace, four years."'
The judicial article imposed several minimum qualifications
as a prerequisite to eligibility for judicial office. A candidate for
the Court of Appeals or a Circuit Court was required to be a
citizen of the United States, a resident of his district for two
years next preceding his election, at least thirty years of age, and a
practicing lawyer for eight years.63 A candidate for the office of
presiding judge or associate judge of a County Court was re-
quired to be a citizen of the United States, over twenty-one years
of age, and a resident of the county for one year next preceding his
election. He was not required to be trained in the legal profes-
sion.64
The judicial article directed the legislature to provide an ade-
quate compensation for judicial services. It required that salaries
of circuit judges be made equal and uniform throughout the
state, and prohibited any reduction of the salaries of circuit
and appellate judges during an incumbent's term.65
Judges of the Court of Appeals and Circuit Courts were re-
movable by impeachment for any misdemeanor in office, or by the
Governor on the address of two-thirds of each House of the
General Assembly for any reasonable cause. 6 judges of County
Courts and justices of the peace were removable upon convic-
tion for malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or for willful neglect
of official duties, subject to appeal of the Court of Appeals.6"
Judges, except those of the Court of Appeals, were required to
62 Ky. Const.; Art. IV, §§ 3, 4, 20, 23, 30 (1850).
63 Id. §§ 8, 22.
641d. § 32.
65 Id. §§ 2, 25.
66 Id. §§ 3, 23.
67id. §36.
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vacate their offices when they moved out of the district from
which elected.68
Clerks of Courts
Under the new article a Clerk for the Court of Appeals was
elected from the state-at-large, and clerks for Circuit and County
Courts were elected from each county. The article also pro-
vided for the election of a Clerk for the Court of Appeals from
each appellate district in which the legislature directed the
court to hold sessions, if any.69
To qualify for Clerk of the Court of Appeals the candidate was
required to be twenty-one years of age, a citizen of the United
States, a resident of Kentucky for two years next preceding his
election, and to present a certificate of qualification endorsed by a
judge either of the Court of Appeals or of a Circuit Court after
examination by the clerk of that judge's court.70 Clerks of Circuit
and County Courts had to be twenty-one years of age, and have
a similar certificate of qualifications. 71
Clerks of all courts were removable by the Court of Appeals
upon information and good cause shown, provided that two-
thirds of the members present concurred.72
V. COURTS FROM 1892 TO 1958
The convention which wrote the present constitution was in
session from September 8, 1890 to September 28, 1891. The dele-
gates were sharply divided on such strong partisan issues as the
slavery clause; the secret ballot, corporate regulation, and court
organization and operation. Four large volumes containing 6,500
pages were required to publish-the debates.
The judicial article of the present constitution outlines in de-
tail the establishment and organization of Kentucky's Judicial
Department. It establishes, in each county, a set of minor courts
consisting of three to eight Justice's Courts, a County Court, a
Fiscal Court, a Quarterly Court, and city Police Courts. In ad-
dition, each county has a trial court of general jurisdiction, the
Circuit Court. One supreme court of general appellate jurisdic-
.68 d. §85.
69 Id. § 11.
70 Id. § 12.
7' Id. Art. VI, H9 1-3.72 Id. Art, IV, § 39.
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tion, the Court of Appeals, serves the entire state. The creation
of any other court is expressly prohibited.
Trial Courts of Limited Jurisdiction
The present judicial article directs the legislature to divide
each county into from three to eight magisterial districts and
authorizes the election of one justice of the peace from each
district.73
Each justice may hold separate court with county-wide juris-
diction: (a) concurrent with Circuit and Quarterly Courts of
civil actions involving an amount up to $200.00; (b) exclusive of
Circuit and concurrent with Quarterly Courts of civil actions
involving an amount up to $50.00.
Their jurisdiction is concurrent with County and Quarterly
Courts in penal and misdemeanor cases in which the maximum
punishment is a $20.00 fine, and concurrent with Circuit Court
in such cases if the maximum punishment is a $500.00 fine or
twelve months imprisonment or both.74 Justices compensated by
fees, pursuant to KRS sec. 64.340 no longer have jurisdiction to
try penal or misdemeanor cases.75 An act of 1958 authorizes fiscal
courts to provide for their compensation by salary, as follows:
$1,200 in counties with a population of 30,000 or less; $2,400 for
counties with a population of 30,000 to 60,000; and $3,600 for
counties with a population of 60,000 to 250,000.76 The validity of
the act is under attack. If valid, the act will restore penal juris-
diction to salaried justices.
Each county has a County Court, which meets monthly with
the county judge presiding. It has exclusive jurisdiction of probate
matters, administration of estates, and juvenile cases. It also has
jurisdiction concurrent with Quarterly and Justice's Courts of
penal and misdemeanor cases in which the maximum punishment
is a $20.00 fine, and concurrent with Quarterly, Justice's and
Circuit Courts of cases in which the maximum punishment is a
$500.00 fine or twelve months imprisonment, or both.77
Each county also has a Quarterly Court. The county judge
73 Ky. Const. § 142.
74 Ibid.; Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 25.660, 25.010, 25.610 (1959). (Hereinafter
referred to as KRS).
76 KRS § 64.255.
77 KRS § 25.010.
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presides and has jurisdiction: (a) concurrent with Justice's and
Police Courts of civil cases (except Police Courts in first, second
and third class cities, which have no civil jurisdiction) involving
an amount up to $200.00; (b) concurrent with Circuit Court of
civil cases involving more than $50.00 but no more than $300.00.
Its penal and misdemeanor jurisdiction extends concurrently with
County and Pustice's Courts, to all cases in which the maximum
punishment is a $20.00 fine, and concurrently with County, Jus-
tice's and Circuit Courts to cases in which the maximum punish-
ment is $500.00 or twelve months imprisonment.78
Each county has a Fiscal Court, which consists of the county
judge presiding over the justices or alternatively the county
commissioners.79 This body exercises legislative and administra-
tive powers, and, functionally, is not a part of the Judicial De-
partment.
The constitution authorizes a city Police Court for each city
or town and defines its jurisdiction according to class of city.
Police Courts in the first three classes have no civil jurisdiction,
but Police Courts in the fourth and fifth classes and in towns ex-
ceeding 250 persons in the sixth class have the same civil juris-
diction as justices of the peace. In all classes they have: (a) ex-
clusive jurisdiction of ordinance violations; (b) jurisdiction, ex-
clusive of Circuit Court, of penal and misdemeanor cases in
which the maximum punishment is a $20.00 fine; and (c) juris-
diction, concurrent with Circuit Court, of penal and misdemeanor
cases in which the maximum punishment is a $500.000 fine or
twelve months imprisonment. Police Courts in all classes have
exclusive examining jurisdiction of all public offenses committed
within the city limits, except that only first class city Police Courts
can examine in homicide cases."0
Trial Court of General jurisdiction
The constitution establishes a Circuit Court in each county.
The legislature has divided the state into forty-six circuit court
districts. Twelve districts contain a single county and the rest
from three to six counties. Terms of Circuit Courts are regulated
by statute.
78 Ibid.
70 Ky. Cont. § 144.
80 Id. § 143; KRS §§ 26.010, 26.020, 26.030.
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The Circuit Court has original jurisdiction of all matters, both
in law and equity, over which jurisdiction is not vested exclusively
in some other tribunal, and of all cases in which title to land is in
question, or in which a provisional remedy is sought for enforce-
ment of a lien upon land for the payment of debt.
Circuit Court has appellate jurisdiction to try de novo: (1)
all orders and judgments of the Fiscal Court and Quarterly Court
over $25.00 in value; (2) all judgments of the County Court over
$50.00 in value, and (3) all orders of the County Court in the
administration of estates.8
Appellate Courts
The framers of the present constitution believed that a single
appellate court was better suited to the needs of the state. They
decided that a single court composed of seven judges and sitting
in two divisions could dispose of as many cases as a four judge
court of last resort and a three judge intermediate appellate
court. Accordingly, the constitution abolished the Superior Court
and established one supreme court. Advocates of the single court
arrangement clinched their victory over the proponents of the in-
termediate court by inserting a provision that prohibits the crea-
tion of any courts not established by the constitution.82
The constitution established one supreme court, the Court
of Appeals, to consist of not less than five nor more than seven
judges. It required the court to meet at Frankfort, but authorized
it to divide itself into sections for the transaction of business.83
Within limits set by the constitution, the legislature fixes the num-
ber of judges, defines the details of the court's appellate juris-
diction, and sets the geographical boundaries of the districts.
In 1895 the legislature increased the number of judges on the
Court of Appeals from four to seven, and the court began to
operate under the two division method. In 1906 one commis-
sioner was employed. Three more were added in 1924, but the
offices of all four were to terminate in 1928. In 1928 the terms
were extended for two more years. The present law, enacted in
1930, authorizes four without specifying a termination date.
81Ky. Const. §§ 126-128; KRS §§ 23.010, 23.030, 23.040.8 2 Levin, op. cit. supra note 1 at 134; Legislative Research Commission, op.
cit. supra note 61; Debates, Constitutional Convention of 1890, Vol. II & Ill,
2994-3168.
83 Ky. Const. §§ 109, 111, 113, 118.
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In defining the details of the court's jurisdiction the legisla-
ture granted it power to review all final orders and judgments,
but then qualified the grant by making specific exceptions and
imposing monetary limits.
Initially, the court had jurisdiction to review the final orders
and judgments of all courts except those: (1) granting a divorce
or punishing a contempt, (2) of a Quarterly, Police, Fiscal or
Justice's Court, (3) of County Court unless the action was for
division of land and allotment of dower, and (4) bonds having
the force of judgments. A monetary limitation precluded appeals
in cases involving the recovery of money or personal property
amounting to less than $100. Three years later the $100 mini-
mum amount was raised to $200. In 1914 it was raised to $500,
but pray appeals were provided in cases involving as much as
$200 and less than $500. The court should grant the prayer if
justice required a reversal or if a question in issue demanded the
construction of a statute or a section of the constitution. Appeal
as a matter of right in land cases was restricted to those directly
involving the title to land, the right to an easement therein, or
the right to enforce a statutory lien thereon.8 4
Today, the court operates under similar statutes, which grant
it power to review all final orders and judgments of circuit courts
in civil cases, subject to the same list of exceptions. The mini-
mum monetary limit on appealable cases is $200. Appeals as a
matter of right are available only in cases involving $2,500 or
more, unless otherwise provided by a special statute. Pray appeals
are permitted in cases involving as much as $200, and less than
$2,500. An act of 1958 authorizes the Court of Appeals to govern,
by rule, the form of application and procedure for appeals when
the 'amount is $200 and under $2,500.15
Judicial Selection, Tenure, Qualifications, Compensation
and Removal
The constitution requires that judges of all courts be elected
from their respective districts by popular vote. 8' Commissioners
of the Court of Appeals are appointed by and serve at the pleas-
ure of the court.87
84 Eblen, "An Intolerable Burden," 40 Ky. L. J. 78 (1951-52), and authori-
ties cited therein.
85 KRS § § 21.060, 21.085.
86Ky. Const. §§ 99, 115, 116, 129, 160. 87 RS § 21150.
1959]
KENTucKy LAw JouR[o4
Judicial tenure depends upon the individual judge's ability
to secure election for terms of years: judges of the Court of
Appeals, eight years; judges of Circuit Courts, six years; judges of
County Courts, four years; and justices of the peace, four years;
and judges of Police Courts, four years.88
The constitution requires several minimum qualifications for
judicial office. A candidate for judge of the Court of Appeals or of
a Circuit Court must be a Kentucky citizen with residence in
the district in which he is a candidate for two years next pre-
ceding his election, thirty-five years or more old, and a practicing
lawyer for eight years.89 Commissioners of the Court of Appeals
must have identical qualifications." A candidate for county judge
or justice of the peace must be a Kentucky citizen with residence
in the state for two years next preceding his election and in his
county or district for one year. He need not be trained in the
legal profession."'
The constitution, as originally adopted, fixed the maximum
salary of state officials at $5,000. This has been amended and
judges of the Court of Appeals now receive $12,000 per annum
and commissioners receive $10,800. Until 1958 judges of Circuit
Courts received $7,500 from the state. This could be augmented
by one or more counties in his district so long as the total com-
pensation did not exceed $8,400. An act of 1958, upheld by the
Court of Appeals, provided that the entire $8,400 must be paid
by the state.92
County judges are compensated by salaries fixed by the Fiscal
Court and, in civil cases by fees under a statutory schedule.9 3
Justices of the peace in counties with 250,000 population re-
ceive a salary of $4,000 payable out of the county treasury. 4 In
other counties Fiscal Courts may provide salaries for justices of
the peace.95
Any circuit judge who is sixty years of age, and has served for
ten years as a regular judge, and has contributed to the special
circuit judge fund for at least two years may retire and be ap-
88 Ky. Const. H 99, 112, 129, 160.
89 Id.§§ 114, 130.
90 KRS § 21.150.
91 Ky. Const. § 100.
92 Id. §§ 112, 183, 246; KRS §§ 64.490, 64.496, 64.500.
93KRS § § 64.230, 64.240, 64.530.
94KRS § 64.250.
95 KRS § 64.255.
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pointed as a special circuit judge. Special circuit judges re-
ceive $3,500 annual salary, plus $150 for each year of regular
judicial service in excess of ten years but not exceeding twenty
years. In addition he is paid expenses, exclusive of per diem ex-
penses, in the same manner as other special judges. 9 As more cir-
cuit judges become eligible for retirement the often expressed de-
sire of many attorneys that a judge rather than an attorney sit as
special judge can be satisfied more fully.
A judge or commissioner of the Court of Appeals with more
than eight years continuous service may retire, and the court
may appoint him as an additional commissioner. The appointment
is upon the same terms and conditions as apply to the four
regular commissioners. 7
Judges of the Court of Appeals and Circuit Courts may be re-
moved by impeachment, or by the Governor on the address of
two-thirds of each House of the General Assembly for any reason-
able causeY8 Commissioners of the Court of Appeals may be re-
moved or replaced by order of the court at its pleasure.99
Judges of County Courts and justices of the peace may be re-
moved by impeachment, or by conviction for malfeasance or
neglect in office. 00 These offices are also vacated when an in-
cumbent moves out of his county or district.1 1
V. SUMMARY
Before statehood our courts consisted of a mere extension of
the Virginia system. Since statehood several major reorganiza-
tions have been made under four constitutions and numerous im-
plementing statutes. Experimentation without a carefully con-
sidered plan is characteristic of most of the reorganizations. The
evident trend has been toward increased restrictions on legisla-
tive action.
The makers of the first constitution followed the federal ex-
ample. The main feature of the judicial provisions was flexibility.
Only the Court of Appeals had constitutional status. The legisla-
90 KRS § 23, 290, 23.310, 23.330, 23.340, 23.850.
97KRS §§ 21.150, 21.151.
98 Ky. Const. §§ 66, 67, 68, 112.
9 9 KRS § 21.50.10 0 Ky. Const. § 68; KRS § 61.170.
lol Ky. Const. §§ 140, 142.
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ture had power to provide for additional courts and to define the
details of organization and jurisdiction. It was a grant of power
without an indigenous plan to follow in exercising it. Neither the
framers of the constitution nor the legislators devised a state
wide plan based on a study of the particular needs in Kentucky.
Instead, we turned to Virginia for a plan, and patterned our
court system after the one then existing in the parent-common-
wealth. Our first system consisted of local trial courts of limited
jurisdiction in each county, a central court with state wide crimi-
nal jurisdiction, and a supreme court with general appellate
jurisdiction of civil cases and trial jurisdiction of land title dis-
putes.
The basic structure of this system lasted only three years.
The 1795 legislature began to experiment. It abolished the central
criminal court and the trial jurisdiction of the supreme court, and
completely reorganized the arrangement for trial of cases.
The new arrangement provided, for the first time, a state wide
trial court system. The basic idea was to establish a trial bench
to serve the entire state by sitting in districts. The trial judges
also sat en banc at Frankfort as a coordinating body to give a
unifying influence to their work in the districts.
The 1799 constitution retained the feature of flexibility, ex-
cept that it required a county court for each county. The legisla-
ture did not disturb the 1795 trial court arrangement during the
period under the second constitution, except by changing the
nomenclature from district to circuit. During this same period the
legislature exercised its discretion with a vengeance. In a bold
experiment, it attempted to abolish the Court of Appeals estab-
lished by the constitution and substitute an appellate court of
its own design and opinion. A struggle between the two tribunals
for recognition lasted for two years. The new court adherents lost
control of the legislature in 1826, and the immediate controversy
was settled in favor of the constitutional court, but the stage was
already set for a third constitution.
The judicial article of the 1850 constitution was more re-
strictive. Flexibility was on its way out. Constitutional status was
given to County Courts, Circuit Courts, and the Court of Appeals.
The legislature still had authority to create other courts, and to
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define the details of organization and jurisdiction of all courts.
During the period under the third constitution the legislature
made three major innovations, one at each level.
On the local level, it created a Court of Claims in each County.
Its functions were mainly legislative and adminstrative in nature.
It was the forerunner of our present Fiscal Court.
At the general trial court level, the state wide concept was
abandoned immediately after adoption of the constitution. Jack-
sonian democracy was in the saddle, aided by bitter memories of
the "Old Court-New Court Struggle." The method of selecting
judges was changed from executive appointment for life to
popular election for a term of years. As an elected official the
circuit judge was responsible only to the electorate of his dis-
trict. For the time being there ceased to be an unifying influence
over the work of the trial courts. Each circuit had its own auto-
nomous court.
At the 'appellate level, the legislature created an intermediate
court of appeals thirty-two years after abandonment of the cen-
trally coordinated trial court arrangement. Its stated purpose was
to assist in handling an increasingly burdensome appellate work-
load. The fact that cases were being tried by many autonomous
courts without the unifying influence of a General Court must
have contributed substantially to the increased number of appeals.
The Superior Court was the object of severe criticism, and
was abolished by the 1892 constitution. Among other things it
had utterly failed to use its authority to certify novel and im-
portant questions to the Court of Appeals. Its supporters tried
to save it by giving the Court of Appeals authority to determine
the novelty and importance of questions. Opponents of the Super-
ior Court carried the day, and clinched their victory by inserting
a prohibition against the creation of any court not established
by the constitution. These are our present County Courts,
Quarterly Courts, Police Courts, Justice's Courts, Circuit Courts
and the Court of Appeals. It is noteworthy that the present Court
of Appeals consists of the same number of judges as the com-
bined membership of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court under the 1850 constitution.
If the flexible language of the early judicial articles amounted
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to a grant of power to the legislature without a plan to follow in
exercising it, the opposite is true of the present judicial article.
Its inflexible language presents a detailed plan without any
legislative discretion to implement it.
